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EFFECTS-BASED AIR CAMPAIGN PLANNING:
THE DIPLOMATIC WAY TO SOLVE AIRPOWER'S ROLE IN
THE 21ST CENTURY

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Preface

The following essay is a compilation of my research and studies over the course of a year in the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. I was assigned to ISD as a National Defense Fellow for the purpose of fulfilling my professional military education requirement for Senior Service School. In effect, I studied at Georgetown instead of attending one of the United States' Military War Colleges. Since I have experience in fighter aviation and campaign planning, I chose a project that would broaden my knowledge of airpower's role in military operations while expanding my understanding of the political and diplomatic sides of planning for the 'use of force'. The project proved to be a significant challenge. The framework for my analysis was Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, but my studies quickly branched out to include research into 'use of force' issues in Bosnia/Operation Deliberate Force in 1995, Iraq/Desert Storm in 1991, and, not surprisingly, Vietnam/Rolling Thunder, Linebacker I and II in the late 60's and early 70's.

I hope this essay proves both interesting and educational to a broad base of readers, whether military or civilian, casual observers or actual practitioners. U.S. military capabilities have progressed to such an incredible level of decisiveness and lethality that understanding their unique advantages will prove essential during this important first decade of the 21st Century.

Abstract

This essay seeks to focus on America's strategy for using our overwhelming advantage in air and space power during Operation Allied Force. While the preponderance of U.S. air and space power lies within the U.S. Air Force, the other services all contain key elements of this great national capability, which I will call 'aerospace power'. It is my conclusion that we did not use our significant advantage efficiently and effectively during Operation Allied Force (OAF). The reasons are varied and complicated, but not so much so that we can't learn from them and avoid similar mistakes in the future. In OAF, our strategy was target-centric and incremental instead of **effects-based and parallel**. Adopting an effects-based operations construct for strategy development and planning will solve many of the dilemmas faced in the events leading up to OAF as well as during the conflict itself. Instead of focusing on specific targets and their destruction in the strategy-formulation phase of planning, our national and international leaders needed to answer two questions. First, what were Serbia's key elements of power that, if destroyed or damaged early in the fighting, would have compelled Milosevic to immediately cease ethnic cleansing operations in Kosovo? Second, what decisive actions should we have taken to adversely influence Milosevic's most prized elements of national power, or centers of gravity, that kept him firmly in charge of his country? By debating and agreeing on definitive answers to these questions instead of focusing on individual targets, our political and military leaders would have achieved victory quicker in Kosovo and ended up with a better political end state for our peacekeepers to manage in the war's aftermath.

Part 1

Prologue

I have been informed by the Supreme Allied Command, Europe that all FRY military and police forces (VJ/MUP) have now departed Kosovo in compliance with the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) signed by the Commander of KFOR and representatives of the FRY Government on 9th June 1999. Acting under the authority granted to me by the North Atlantic Council, I have accordingly decided to terminate with immediate effect the air campaign, which I suspended on 10th June 1999.¹

With this statement, Secretary General Javier Solana at Headquarters, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ended the 78-day military campaign known to the world as Operation Allied Force (OAF). This significant ‘out-of-area military operation’ by NATO marked the most dramatic use of force by the Cold War alliance that served the European continent so well in the post-World War II era. The crisis in the Balkans involving the present and former provinces of Yugoslavia had irritated European politics since the fall of the Berlin Wall in the early 90s. Following the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic turned his sights on the independent-minded Kosovo province in the southern part of his disintegrating federation. His intention became obvious over time -- to consolidate power in Kosovo by driving out the Kosovar-Albanian majority. By 24 March 1999, his brutal ethnic cleansing strategy was reaching its apex and NATO was forced to intervene militarily to counter these destabilizing

events on Europe's southern flank. The significant distinction of the resulting Allied Force operation was the unilateral role air and space assets played as the force application elements of the overall strategy to counter Milosevic's intentions and actions.

Notes

¹ NATO Headquarters Press Release (1999) 101 as reported on United States European Command Website, www.eucom.mil with permission of NATO, 20 Jun 99.

Part 2

INTRODUCTION

Undeniably, after Operations Allied Force and Deliberate Force in the Balkans, and Desert Fox and Desert Storm in Iraq, aerospace power has become a significant instrument of national power that political leaders, both U.S. and others, often turn to in times of crisis.¹ Since Desert Storm, the U.S. military's global power projection capabilities have become an increasingly important tool central in addressing U.S. and allied security challenges around the world.

The different military strategies employed in each of these operations reflect the complicated calculus inherent in conducting modern warfare. The implications of our unique advantages in aerospace power are sometimes even harder to understand and exploit. The overriding intention of this essay, however, is to reinforce the importance of **effects-based military operations** versus target-centric planning and strategy development experienced during the conduct of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.

OUTLINE

This essay seeks to focus on America's strategy for using our overwhelming advantage in air and space power before, during and after Operation Allied Force. Using the arguments contained in this study, I will summarize specific recommendations for future use of these decisive capabilities in the next military operation.

The central question of this analysis is: "Did the U.S. and NATO leaders use the military instrument of power efficiently and effectively in Kosovo given the political and military restraints in the crisis?" The analysis will focus on military successes and failures in the campaign, as well as on the adequacy and clarity of political and diplomatic assessments and guidance. A key question one must answer in order to address the central question is: "Did military planners receive sufficient guidance and a grand strategy to plan and execute the air campaign?" I studied the guidance and assessment for the campaign plan by considering the 'desired effects' inherent in the strategy. Airpower experts use this 'effects-based operations' construct to shape national interests and security objectives into specific military objectives and tasks. Since the international discussion after every military operation inevitably focuses on intended and unintended effects, this construct of campaign planning must form the basis of the evaluation before, during and after a conflict.

Following this point, I will seek to answer the question: "Was the operation an efficient and decisive use of U.S. and NATO aerospace power in accordance with military doctrine and air power planning guidance?" Next, I'll investigate the process by which our leaders determined key areas of Yugoslav national power and strength from the standpoint of Slobodan Milosevic and his other key leaders. The assessment of so-called 'adversary centers of gravity' by our civilian and military leaders is a key component in determining the military's overall strategy for achieving victory. Equally important in this review of OAF are the restraints —both political and military—placed on the commanders and planners in actually executing the campaign. I will discuss the

significant restraints and endeavor to measure their effect on the overall conduct of the campaign.

Finally, I researched the American public's understanding of and expectations for U.S. air and space capabilities during war and peace. These forces evolved at a significant cost to the American taxpayer and so a complete understanding of their implications and capabilities is required to ensure Americans come to expect the highest return on the dollar in wielding this substantial instrument of national power. Within the framework of these questions, I will formulate a better model of **effects-based operations** for both civilian and military leaders of our country to use in the development and prosecution of our next military campaign. Effects-based operations are attacks or operations conducted against an adversary's key elements of national power and functions in the most efficient manner to produce a specific effect consistent with the commander's objectives and the National Command Authorities' stated goals. The U.S.'s decisive air and space capabilities permit the freedom of maneuver and precise destructiveness to quickly coerce our next adversary into desired behavior changes, or even capitulation, if our National Command Authorities (NCA) and the international community decide that is required.

Notes

¹ A note on the use of terms. Air Force Doctrine Document 1-2, *Air Force Glossary*, 9 Jul 1999, defines *aerospace power* as "the synergistic application of air, space and information systems to project global strategic military power." *Aerospace power*, as it is used in this paper, describes the use of aircraft, spacecraft, and information in the air and/or space medium to project military power in order to create political and military effects. *Air power* and *space power* are subsets of aerospace power. *Aerospace power* will be used throughout the text unless citing a work that uses another similar term (e.g., *air power*, *airpower*, *air and space power*) or if the term, *air power*, is required in the context of reflecting the time before space flight. The same general meaning is inferred regardless.

Part 3

POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS...STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS

Before dissecting the military campaign plan for Operation Allied Force, it is important to investigate the clarity of our overall strategic objectives and national interests. Since U.S. aerospace power has the capability to strike *immediately* at the heart of an adversary's centers of gravity, our strategy, objectives and desired end-state need to be clear and complete in order to effectively exploit our military advantage.

Purpose of the Operation

In a 24 March 1999 press conference marking the beginning of OAF, President Clinton listed U.S. national interests in the Balkans as the protection of human rights in Kosovo as well as the maintenance of European stability. In his address to the American people, he outlined the purpose of the operation as follows:

- 1) To demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to aggression and its support for peace
- 2) To deter President Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians by imposing a price for these attacks
- 3) If necessary, to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future by seriously diminishing its military capability.¹

In the same press conference, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen went on to reiterate that "NATO forces have initiated military action against the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia...the military objectives of our actions [are] to deter further action against the Kosovars and to diminish the ability of the Yugoslav army to continue those attacks if necessary.”² These statements by the U.S. National Command Authorities communicated the resolve and agreement of the 19 member nations in NATO.

Implications

The implication of the first point in President Clinton’s list, “the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to aggression and its support for peace,” is clear in terms of developing military objectives and tasks. The very fact that the alliance was willing to use military force in the internal conflict of another nation no doubt sent the message that NATO leaders found the atrocities committed by Milosevic’s military and police forces totally unacceptable. The second and third points, however, became the critical catalysts for strategy development in this conflict. Determining the ‘price’ Milosevic was unwilling to pay for his actions was the key element of the allies’ military operation. According to President Clinton, we would deter Milosevic from continuing his state sponsored atrocities if we extracted a so-called specific “price” for his unacceptable actions. In a book titled *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument*, Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman and Eric Larson laid out the theory behind the determination of this so-called ‘price to pay’. The authors write, “[s]uccess or failure is decided by the target state’s decision calculus with regard to costs and benefits...When the benefits that would be lost by concessions and the probability of attaining these benefits by continued resistance are exceeded by the costs of resistance and the probability of suffering these costs, the target concedes.”³ Determining a strategy to extract these costs from Milosevic would prove to be a significant challenge for the alliance.

Equally important in developing the strategy for OAF was the degree to which our forces would have to damage Milosevic's military and police forces in order to make them either unable or unwilling to continue their ethnic cleansing actions. The military commanders and planners were given the challenging job of developing a campaign plan that would result in a set of tasks (not necessarily targets) that flowed directly from the purpose articulated by our leaders. The question is, did President Clinton, Secretary Cohen and the rest of the leaders of the North Atlantic Council really articulate a grand strategy, or did they leave it to the military planners to propose one and then take it under advisement in the target selection process? The first section of my essay examines the planning process that preceded the commencement of hostilities on 24 March 1999.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Parallel Planning

U.S. Army General Wesley Clark acted in two capacities before, during and after this conflict. In military parlance, he wore 'two hats' throughout the conduct of Operation Allied Force. As the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SACEUR, he was the senior military commander in the NATO chain of command and the primary military advisor to the North Atlantic Council.⁴ In this capacity, he was the prime conduit for developing strategy with civilian leaders and relaying it to his military commanders in the form of Commander's Intent. General Clark was also the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) making him the senior military officer in the U.S. chain of command for any operations involving American military forces in Europe.

He had the difficult task of coordinating planning efforts between U.S. and NATO staffs leading up to actual hostilities during the NATO-led Operation Allied Force. In consultation with President Clinton, Secretary Cohen and other NATO civilian leaders, General Clark and his senior staff devised the campaign plan used during the war. It is important to note that many military analysts contend that there never was a fully developed NATO military campaign plan for Operation Allied Force. While this essay avoids addressing that particular indictment of the overall planning of the operation, it is still important to note the sharp disagreement between high-level military strategists.⁵

United States Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Short, the OAF Joint and Combined Forces Air Component Commander during the campaign, explained this process in detail during an interview with a Public Broadcasting System reporter after the war. In the interview, General Short explained that he was first given the planning task for limited air operations in and around Kosovo through the U.S.-only chain of command. Then, in June of 1998, he was directed through NATO command channels to begin planning for a more robust air campaign to include missions and tasks throughout all of former Republic of Yugoslavia. General Short states that, in mid-1998, his staff began “to develop the classic air campaign...and we had a great deal of liaison with the U.S. Headquarters at Ramstein [a U.S. Air Force Base in Germany] United States Air Forces in Europe.”⁶ When asked to elaborate on what a classic air campaign meant, Short replied that his planners recommended going after “what we believed to be the strategic target set in Belgrade. The power grid, the lines of communication...the bridges across the Danube...six to eight military command centers, headquarters of the MUP, headquarters of the VJ, once again in Belgrade” and all in the first night of declared

hostilities.⁷ This was General Short's assessment of the strategy that was required to meet the second and third elements of the operation outlined in President Clinton's March press conference.

General Short's planners developed and refined a strategic air campaign plan that attacked what they felt were key centers of gravity in Serbia. The master attack plan would combine detailed tasks conducted with specific timing to cause strategic-level effects in Milosevic's power base and ultimately compel him to accept international demands laid out in the Rambouillet Accords. Short and his expert advisors made their own assessment of the so-called "price" Milosevic would be unwilling to pay for his continued atrocities. The U.S. planners briefed General John Jumper, commander of United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), and, after receiving Jumper's approval, took the plan to General Clark for his review as SACEUR. Clark directed that this plan be further refined in U.S.-only channels by USAFE staffers while his NATO staff simultaneously planned a more incremental, phased air campaign against Slobodan Milosevic's forces in and around Kosovo. Short intimated after the war that he felt the resulting five-phased NATO plan he later observed did not constitute a decisive use of military force and would not be an effective strategy to extract the right "price" from Milosevic to deter future actions. Short summed up the NATO plan in these words: "...except for the integrated air defenses in and around Belgrade, the Barnika airfield, the SA-3 sites, et cetera, the fight was not taken north of 44 [degrees north latitude] until phase three. This was not the way we (the U.S.) wanted to do business...but this was planning for, this was diplomatic posturing."⁸ In other words, this plan focused on

refinements of the diplomatic efforts that had, up until then, been unsuccessful in convincing Milosevic to change his own course of action in Kosovo.

Military Objectives

After numerous iterations of both the U.S. only and NATO plans, the final NATO mission statement was agreed on using strategic guidance from the U.S. National Command Authorities and the North Atlantic Council. It read: “NATO forces [will] conduct air operations against military targets throughout FRY to attack Serbian capability to continue repressive actions against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.” The specific military objectives listed by NATO were as follows:

- 1. Enable unhindered NATO Air Operations**
- 2. Isolate VJ/MUP forces in Kosovo**
- 3. Degrade combat capability of VJ/MUP forces in Kosovo**
- 4. Compel FRY leaders to withdraw their forces from Kosovo**
- 5. Reduce FRY capability to conduct & sustain offensive operations**

NATO also stated that the campaign plan’s strategy hinged on three tenets:

- 1. Enable operations by obtaining and maintaining air and information superiority**
- 2. Pressure the FRY leadership by attacking high value targets throughout the battle space**
- 3. Degrade FRY military capability to conduct offensive operations in Kosovo⁹**

The civilian guidance for this military operation concluded with a list of actions Milosevic would have to take to end allied offensive operations. These criteria, as defined in a British Ministry Defense memorandum, were to:

- 1. Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo;**
- 2. Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and paramilitary [MUP and VJ] forces;**
- 3. Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;**

- 4. Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and**
- 5. Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework agreement based on the Rambouillet accords.¹⁰**

As General Short alluded to in his PBS interview, what was not clear to the military planners and commanders at this point in the planning process was the acceptable strategy to task guidance for execution of the campaign.¹¹ The phased, incremental nature of the ultimate campaign plan left the air planners confused as to what effects their actions should have in the enemy's power base. Short had already stated to General Clark his belief that the incremental, phased campaign developed by NATO planners to achieve the military objectives and desired end state was just a 'diplomatic tool' and not the real plan. The detailed master attack plan developed by the U.S. planners differed greatly in the phasing and severity of early attacks, the overall tempo of operations, and finally the assessed vulnerable centers of gravity in Milosevic's regime. The strategy used in the final version of this 'air-centric' military campaign was not what the senior U.S. Air Force officers in the NATO chain of command felt it should be. In order to 'compel' FRY leaders to withdraw their forces from Kosovo and cease hostilities, one of the stated objectives, NATO's civilian leaders selected a strategy of phased, incremental application of force against Yugoslavia's military and police forces expecting the results of those attacks would compel Milosevic to accept their demands. The senior air commander had wanted a much more decisive strategy that included a devastating first blow. U.S. Army General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the senior military advisor to the U.S. National Command Authorities acknowledged

this disconnect in a lecture at the Fletcher Conference on Strategic Responsiveness after the war. In his talk, Shelton noted, “there were some disconnects between strategic objectives and military objectives in Operation Allied Force.”¹² The chairman of the JCS went on to note that the operation was still a success, but his point was that strategic and military objectives must be clear and attainable and in concert with U.S. military doctrine in order to maximize military capabilities and minimize loss of life. Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, a command pilot, PhD and the senior USAF member on the U.S. Naval War College faculty, put it another way when he said:

One of the unusual aspects of this war [was] that the political goal as espoused by NATO [related] to ethnic cleansing; however, as the Pentagon briefer [said] daily, the military goal [was] merely one of degrading Serbia’s capability to conduct ethnic cleansing. In short, we may have [had] a classic policy/strategy mismatch.¹³

Uncertain Strategy

NATO’s planners followed the guidance of their civilian and military leaders and set out to devise the new attack plan that would be used to prosecute the war daily. The problem they continually faced, though, was the uncertainty of the strategy. In the absence of an allied ground operation and faced with limited air assets, they suspected the incremental attacks would not produce the desired effects necessary to achieve the stated objectives, at least not in the early phases of the campaign.

Lieutenant Colonel Jos Vanschoenwinkel, an officer in the Belgian Air Force, was Chief of Air Operations in Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) and an air planner during OAF. In an article in Code One magazine, he stated that NATO’s “initial strategy ‘actually gave the Serbs some advantage.’” He felt that in the early phases of the war “we wanted to teach the Serbs a lesson. We were asked to drop

bombs, but not to do much damage". Vanschoenwinkel went on to state that the Allies "did not start with clearly defined objectives of destroying Serbia's war potential. The beginning [of the operation] was more like a punitive expedition."¹⁴

General Short confirmed this NATO planner's concern over the initial prosecution of the war when he stated "one more time [we] took [the U.S. plan] to General Clark, now I'm guessing a week before the first bomb dropped, and it was just, for political reasons, sensitivities of the alliance, not an acceptable alternative. So we were postured from that point on to strike about 90 targets in the first three nights...the instruction I got [from SACEUR] is: ...you're only [going to] be allowed to bomb two, maybe three nights. That's all Washington can stand, that's all some members of the alliance can stand...this'll be over in three nights."¹⁵ Short went on to indicate that the 90 targets were primarily Integrated Air Defense targets both north and south of the 44 [degree latitude] line. They did not, however, include the other more strategic targets he had planned for in his U.S.-only campaign plan. The only effect he planned on having in this first limited phase of the campaign was to degrade the FRY forces' ability to protect themselves from the attacking NATO forces. NATO was not, in his opinion, going to achieve any decisive effects on the enemy's will to wage war against the Kosovar-Albanians. What had started out as an air campaign plan designed to attack Milosevic's most prized possessions and elements of national power had evolved into a punitive strike designed to send a message that NATO was serious but not dead serious.

Senator Max Cleland expanded on this discussion during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in the aftermath of Kosovo. During testimony with General Shelton and Secretary of Defense Cohen, Cleland stated, while he felt "air dominance

wins wars and saves lives,” he also believed that “a lot of our objectives [in OAF] were articulated in a fuzzy way.”¹⁶ Determining the strategy for extracting an untenable ‘price’ for Milosevic and his cronies was not, in the end, a very precise or well-thought out process. According to Secretary of Defense Cohen, “Had the United States been planning this operation, it would have been different. There were a lot of difficulties as to how this was put together.”¹⁷

U.S. doctrine and war planning techniques have evolved to new heights with respect to our ability to analyze an enemy’s system of power and influence. This analysis is used to derive plans that produce effects at the strategic level of warfare. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) is one of the agencies tasked to provide this capability. This center of excellence in Northern Virginia serves the U.S. National Command Authorities and worldwide CINCs who engage in deliberate and contingency planning processes, seeking to measure the impact of specific military courses of action. Using the effects-based operations planning construct, these military and civilian planners are uniquely qualified to recommend grand strategies, precision-targeting options for selected networks and nodes, and the required **effects** on enemy systems in order to achieve desired end states in particular regions of the world.¹⁸

As contemporary history notes of the air war over Kosovo, the first three nights of punitive strikes against Milosevic’s fielded forces did little to deter him from continuing his ethnic cleansing and other atrocities in Kosovo. In fact, many argue, the strikes actually encouraged him to step up the pace of ethnic cleansing since the ‘price’ he was paying in those first few nights of attacks was not that costly. NATO leaders, both

civilian and military alike, were forced to reevaluate the strategy they had chosen in Phase One of Operation Allied Force.

Notes

¹ Air Force Association Report: *The Kosovo Campaign: Airpower Made it Work* by Rebecca Grant, September, 1999 p 8.

² Ibid. p. 2.

³ *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument* by Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman and Eric Larson, Project Air Force, RAND, p. 15.

⁴ According to the DoD Report to Congress titled “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report”, 31 Jan 00, ‘In the NATO command structure, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) [General Clark] reported to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and had operational control of the NATO regional commanders, including the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) [Admiral James Ellis]. The Commander, Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (COMARRC) was separated from the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, and not engaged in operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. CINCSOUTH, headquartered in Naples, Italy, exercised operational control over Allied Naval Forces, Southern Europe (NAVSOUTH), Allied Strike Forces, Southern Europe (STRKFORSOUTH), and Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH). The Commander Allied Air Forces, Southern Europe [Lt General Short], was also the Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC), and thus controlled the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) and all the air forces in the NATO southern region’ p. 17.

⁵ Col John Warden, USAF, (retired), is just such a strategist, one of the strongest advocates of airpower’s new and decisive role in 21st Century warfare. In an Inside the Pentagon article titled “Kosovo War Tactics Compensated for Strategy Void, Expert Says”, 1 Jul 99, Elaine M. Grossman summarizes some of Wardens strongest statements when she writes that he “...said the efficiency of airpower compensated for serious weaknesses in NATO’s approach, and did so with a complete lack of allied casualties...It looked to me as though the grand strategy...[in Kosovo]...changed on a daily basis...We started out with a humanitarian objective, stopping the outflow of Albanians from Kosovo and stopping ethnic cleansing. As it became clear that this objective was not working, the grand strategy shifted to maintaining the credibility of NATO.”

⁶ Interview with Lieutenant General Michael Short, USAF, conducted by Public Broadcasting System Reporter, Roll # 250; personal copy p.10.

⁷ Ibid. p. 12.

⁸ Ibid. p. 17

⁹ Kosovo Quick Look Briefing Narrative, Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States Department of Defense

¹⁰ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Website, briefing narrative on Kosovo – An Account of the Crisis: NATO’s Objectives

¹¹ The strategy to task concept is the charting of connections between strategic objectives through military objectives all the way down to specific tasks assigned to

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particular fighting units. Using this methodology, military commanders and planners are able to analyze the effects of their actions in the conduct of warfare in order to assess success or failure of military operations at the three levels of warfare: strategic, operational and tactical.

¹² Speech by U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Henry H. Shelton, at the Fletcher Conference on Strategic Responsiveness, 2 Nov 99.

¹³ Personal Interview with Colonel Phillip Meilinger, USAF, senior USAF member on the U.S. Naval War College faculty, conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Beene, USAF, at U.S. Naval War College 3 Dec 99.

¹⁴ Comments by Lieutenant Colonel Jos Vanschoenwinkel, Chief of Air Operations, Combined Air Operations Center, Vicenza, during OAF as printed in Code One Magazine, October 1999, p. 27.

¹⁵ Lt Gen Short PBS interview, p. 36.

¹⁶ Quote by U.S. Senator Max Cleland during Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Kosovo with General Shelton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen.

¹⁷ Quote by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen during Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Kosovo with General Shelton

¹⁸ Mission statement for Joint Warfare Analysis Center as listed on Unclassified Home Page (.mil domain)

Part 4

OAF STRATEGY EVOLVES

*No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter is its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.*¹

Carl Von Clausewitz

Since Phase One of Operation Allied Force had not produced victory and an end to Milosevic's atrocities in Kosovo, the National Command Authorities and North Atlantic Council were forced to reevaluate their strategy for the next phase of OAF. In order to realize their political goals, NATO planners needed stronger political resolve and more forces committed. These actions would not be immediately attainable in the next phase of the campaign.

A peripheral figure in this strategic discussion was General John P. Jumper. Even though he was not in the operational chain of command for OAF, Jumper was, as the Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, the main provider of trained aircrews and weapon systems for the prosecution of the air campaign. In an interview on the conduct of OAF, he outlined what he considered was a 'doctrinally-perfect' process of developing

an air campaign plan. In General Jumper's words, this process says "The political leadership crafts the desired political outcome... its handed down to some CINC'ly authority, that crafts it into broad strategic military objectives... that comes down through some joint task force, that puts it into more refined and specific guidance... that is turned over to the JFACC to turn into targeting to produce the result... I think the emerging reality is that we are never going to have that construct."²

Jumper acknowledged in the interview that after nearly 40 iterations of the OAF campaign plan, the war planners were directed to concentrate on 50 or so targets that would punish Milosevic in a minimal manner in order to convince him NATO was serious. When this action failed to compel the Serbian leader to do anything but step up his ethnic cleansing in Kosovo the next phase of the air campaign began to develop. But, unfortunately, the next phase still lacked clear guidance from political leaders on what actions needed to be taken to achieve desired effects versus just hitting more and varied targets. According to General Jumper, military planners "have to learn...to articulate the tradeoffs between efficiency of a well-planned air campaign, that takes into account all of these sophisticated techniques of targeting – the effects-based targets where you hit precisely the number of targets just in [the right] place to produce this effect. It's got to be balanced with the reality that, at the political level, many are going to say 'no' to certain targets on your list that will spoil your plan entirely."³ This brings to mind U.S. Senator Max Cleland's comments about fuzzy objectives – objectives written vaguely enough to keep from defining the real level of national or coalition resolve to prosecute a war. As airmen, soldiers and sailors in a democratic society, we are compelled by oath to support the Constitution and follow the lawful orders of our commander-in-chief. But,

we should expect clear direction and guidance on how to plan for war and then be given the latitude to prosecute it in the most efficient manner. According to Jumper, air campaign planners “at the level of our political-military interface...at the CINC level...have to have enough influence on the argument to embolden the military leadership to present wise alternatives to the political leadership in a convincing and compelling manner.”⁴

Time-Proven Rules

Casper Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, addressed these controversial issues during a speech at the Air Force Association’s 1999 Convention. In his talk, he reiterated his 6-point doctrinal construct for the use of U.S. military force – better known as the Weinberger Doctrine. He stated that OAF met only the first of his tenets, the one stating the situation had to be deemed ‘vital to our national interests’. Regarding the third component, clearly defined political and military objectives, Weinberger stated, “What we did was pretty much what we had done in Vietnam. We did not go in to win.” He went on to say that due to political restraints, the initial phasing of the air operation was “basically ineffective” and that we did not become effective until “much later in the campaign when we decided to go after particular targets that were much more militarily significant.”⁵

This gradualism may have been the agreed upon strategy by the North Atlantic Council, but in reality, the air planners were not really ready for the increase in tempo called upon after the first few days of the war. According to General Short’s planners, it took until the middle of the operation to fully man the Combined Air Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, and only then did the planners begin to conduct regular ‘Guidance,

Apportionment and Targeting' meetings to refine the strategy of the campaign.⁶ Of even greater significance is the fact that they did not have sufficient assets in theater to increase the tempo of the operation after the early strikes. Only night operations were available to the CAOC staff due to limited numbers of aircrews and weapons systems' capabilities as well as support assets. Because of this initial restraint in deploying forces, General Short stated that the enemy actually took the opportunity to increase the pace of his ethnic cleansing during the day and was more able to protect his fielded forces in Kosovo.⁷

After recognizing these limitations, the strategy in Operation Allied Force evolved and began to move closer to the classic air campaign General Short imagined in June 1998. With regard to this 'evolving' strategy, comparisons between Operation Allied Force and the war in Vietnam are as inevitable as they are striking. During the Vietnam War, operations Rolling Thunder and Linebacker I failed to convince the North Vietnamese leaders to accept peace in any meaningful manner. The U.S. National Command Authorities then removed many of the political restraints and unleashed a furious attack on all parts of North Vietnam during Linebacker II. These attacks were designed to extract a high price for continuing the war by striking key military and civilian targets in Hanoi as well as the rest of the country. With this decisive shift in strategy, the North Vietnamese leaders were compelled to accept peace negotiations effectively ending the conflict.

Colonel Harry Summers, a renowned military strategist, outlined this problem in his book *On Strategy—A Critical Analysis of The Vietnam War*. In his book, he wrote, "The confusion over objectives ... had a devastating effect on our ability to conduct the

war. As Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard found in a 1974 survey of Army generals who had commanded in Vietnam, ‘almost 70 percent of the Army generals who managed the war were uncertain of its objectives.’ Kinnard went on to say that this ‘mirrors a deep-seated strategic failure: the inability of policy-makers to frame tangible, obtainable goals’.”⁸

New Strategy

The difficult and painful lessons we discovered after Vietnam were still present in the minds of many U.S. military leaders during Operation Allied Force. These lessons formed the basis for developing a new strategy in the air war over Serbia. Mr. John Keegan, defense editor for the Daily Telegraph, pointed out that the evolving strategy in the latter parts of the Kosovo campaign finally enabled NATO planners to unleash “the startling effectiveness of precision munitions that minimized ‘inessential damage’ and forced Milosevic to give in because of the crippling damage done to the Serbian armed forces and Serbia’s civilian infrastructure.”⁹ The Joint Warfare Analysis Center, whose staff assisted in this evolution of OAF strategy, specializes in the art of minimizing collateral damage and, ultimately, in limiting unintended effects. The level of detail they use advising commanders has proven valuable in countless real-world operations. Colonel Phil Meilinger, USAF, says U.S. military planners used to be able to analyze only tactical effects of warfare and not operational and strategic effects. Today, he says, “JWAC is beginning to do that [analyze the strategic and operational effects of possible courses of action for our combatant commanders].”¹⁰

Once the strategy moved to attacking important targets for strategic effect and stalking the VJ/MUP forces day and night, OAF ultimately achieved its stated goals.

However, this movement toward achieving desired strategic effects happened very slowly even after the military leaders were given the go-ahead. Since military leaders could not authorize strikes on many of the targets on their own, the process required many days to get controversial targets approved by NATO and U.S. political authorities. Legitimate, concentrated, and parallel effects were still difficult to achieve in the latter phases of OAF. In his testimony to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee after the war, General Henry Shelton stated, “I think we have to really have greater thought given to target approval...the target approval process in the future.” He continued his critique of the planning and execution of OAF by saying the U.S., in conjunction with our allies is “currently developing plans and NATO training scenarios that will address [the] NATO doctrinal target approval process to ease the start-up...and smooth the decision making process.”¹¹

Understanding the capabilities inherent in state-of-the-art weaponry and resulting changes in the operational art of warfare is key for U.S. and Allied civilian policy makers as well. These training scenarios mentioned by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must include high level civilian policy makers in order to raise their understanding of the new capabilities of warfare. Lieutenant General Marvin Esmond, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, writes in an official White Paper for Global Engagement Operations that U.S. forces must be able to exploit air and space power throughout the full spectrum of military operations. He goes on to say that, “to achieve this aim, the AF must first tap...America’s air and space potential...that may be underutilized in legacy war fighting constructs.”¹² These legacy constructs are the antithesis to the OAF strategy proposed by General Jumper, USAFE commander, and

General Short, the JFACC for the campaign. As Jumper stated, airmen cannot expect to ever be given free reigns to prosecuting 21st century aerial warfare, but a move toward those new ideas and doctrine is required if we are to gain any benefit from our high-tech, high-cost weapons of today. Simply applying force against an enemy's military as a way of signaling 'resolve' with punitive measures is an inefficient use of our air and space capability. Once the decision to use military force is taken, striking directly at the heart of the problem should be the key element to our strategy in future conflicts. General Short felt that OAF's early attacks fell in the category of "random bombings of military targets" and were not really a classic air campaign in the true sense of the phrase. He felt Phase One of OAF could better be described as "an air effort at the tactical level, superbly done by the young men and women that flew airplanes...but not an air campaign as men and women in my profession have studied it and would have wished to have done."¹³ The campaign plan employed during Operation Allied Force, in Short's opinion as well as many other proponents of new doctrinal approaches to 21st century warfare, was anchored in an old way of thinking: attacking fielded military forces in an incremental, gradual manner. It was not the most effective way to prosecute war with the United States' precision weapons and superior planning capabilities.

Notes

¹ Carl von Clausewitz "On War", Chapter 11, p. 367.

² Personal Interview with General John Jumper, USAF, Commander United States Air Forces Europe during Operation Allied Force, by Lt Colonel Jeff Beene, 13 Oct 99, page 1.

³ Ibid p. 2.

⁴ Ibid p. 3.

⁵ Weinberger Rules as written in *The Commanders*, by Bob Woodward, Simon & Schuster, Copyright 1991, page 117.

⁶ Personal interviews with Lt Colonel Michael Rollison, and Major Tony Eret, CAOC Vicenza air planners, by Lt Colonel H.D. Polumbo (author), 9 and 16 Dec 99.

Notes

⁷ Interview with Lieutenant General Michael Short, USAF, conducted by Public Broadcasting System Reporter, Roll # 250; personal copy p. 44.

⁸ *On Strategy- A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., US Army; quoting a 1974 statement made by Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, p. 149.

⁹ Quote by Mr. John Keegan, Defense Editor- Daily Telegraph, in an article titled "So the Bomber Got Through to Milosevic After All"

¹⁰ Personal Interview with Colonel Phillip Meilinger, USAF, senior USAF member on the U.S. Naval War College faculty, conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Beene, USAF, at U.S. Naval War College 3 Dec 99.

¹¹ Statement by U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Henry Shelton, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning Lessons Learned in Operation Allied Force.

¹² Statement in USAF publication "Global Engagement Operations" by Lt General Marvin Esmond, USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, p. 8.

¹³ Lt General Short PBS interview, p. 5.

Part 5

IF NOT OVERWHELMING FORCE, THEN WHAT?

As mentioned earlier, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's doctrine laid out the tenets for committing U.S. forces in combat. In this document, he emphasized the fact that, if we do commit them, "we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning."¹ President George Bush and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell took this doctrine a step further by coining the phrase "overwhelming force" when considering how much of American's military might should be used when we commit our sons and daughters to combat.² Moreover, the U.S. rarely enters combat situations unilaterally. In the context of coalition warfare, these doctrinal tenets must be adjusted to maintain the integrity of our alliances. In his speech to the Fletcher Conference on Strategic Responsiveness, German Army General Klaus Nauman, NATO Military Committee Chairman, made the broad statement that "coalitions will not allow us to use overwhelming force."³ While General Nauman is probably correct in limited warfare involving coalition forces, this statement begs the question: if not overwhelming, then what level of force should we use to counter the atrocities and crimes of our common adversaries? The answer lies, many times, in the firm application of aerospace power quickly and decisively at the strategic level of an

adversary's system of support and power. These points of vulnerability are more commonly referred to as the enemy's centers of gravity (COGs) and they form the foundation for effects-based operations and detailed air campaign planning. The discussions, disagreement and dissention on this issue among military and civilian leaders before and during Operation Allied Force have been well documented. The important lessons learned from OAF should be applied at the political-military interaction level. Decisive guidance from civilian leaders should be provided to the military commanders in order to formulate strategy that articulates the desired effects needed to coerce the adversary into compliance with international law and order. "Fuzzy" objectives, as categorized by Senator Max Cleland in OAF's aftermath, and indecisiveness on what Milosevic held dear in his power base led to an ineffective first few weeks of the air campaign.

It is also important to note here that the resistance of powerful members of the North Atlantic Council, most notably France, led to a double abdication of U.S. military doctrine since we did not use overwhelming force and did not really attack Serbia's and Milosevic's true COGs. According to John A. Tirpack, Senior Editor of Air Force Magazine, General Short resisted the "massive...tank plinking effort in Kosovo" since he felt it wasted valuable assets and did little to achieve NATO's stated goals. He went on to say "...only when NATO shifted its emphasis to attacking pivotal targets in and around Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia, did it finally compel Serb President Slobodan Milosevic to accept terms."⁴ In the November issue of Air Force Magazine, Tirpack again addressed this issue when he quoted General Wesley Clark by writing: "Wholesale destruction of the Serb army was not necessarily a goal of the tactical effort. Rather,

“what we had been successful in doing was keeping it [the Serb army] in hiding, under wraps, ineffective.”⁵

In this author’s opinion, the discussion in this case and others to follow as to whether an adversary’s army is a center of gravity is misguided and parochial. If the enemy’s army is an effective military organization, possessing lethal means to prosecute war on a large scale, it is always a center of gravity for that country’s leadership and power base. The discussion between civilian and military planners regarding this issue should focus only on what destructive and disruptive effect our military operations should have on these ground forces. If strategic objectives include rendering the army ineffective as a fighting force and causing the enemy state to capitulate, a high level of effort should be committed to this end. If controlling its movement and operations is a tactical objective, as Clark pointed out was the case in OAF, a lower level of effort should be placed on that task. In the event of large-scale ground combat involving U.S. personnel, all available and appropriate assets should be committed to supporting those American soldiers on the ground. They are all part of the same priceless entity that is usually described in the U.S. political forum as ‘our nation’s sons and daughters’. However, in the absence of any developed ground operations involving U.S. or allied troops, repeatedly attacking the enemy’s dug-in army may not prove to be a viable or cost-effective task for the allied air forces if overwhelming forces do not exist in the theater of operation. As discussed by SACEUR in the case of OAF, maintaining the enemy ground forces in defensive positions might be the main effect required of the military planners. The only flaw in the early phases of OAF was the limited number of allied forces available for this task. Since we did not patrol the skies over Kosovo during

the day, Milosevic's military and police forces were given free run of the country during daylight hours and obviously remained very effective in their ethnic cleansing operations.

Parallel Warfare

Another interesting note on this topic is raised in Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton's report to Congress on Operation Allied Force. In the report, dated 31 January 2000, our defense leaders stated that Milosevic's integrated air defense systems did not always engage NATO aircraft with full system integration. In the text, Cohen and Shelton wrote “[t]he Serbs chose to conserve their air defenses, while attempting to down NATO aircraft as targets of opportunity.”⁶ The argument can be made that had we accurately assessed and attacked the true Serbian centers of gravity early in the campaign, Milosevic may have either capitulated earlier or ordered his forces to resist the invading forces with ‘all-available means.’ The fact that he ‘conserved’ his air defense forces early on in the conflict indicates that we had not correctly targeted his specific sources of national power and weren’t, in effect, extracting a very high price for his continued recalcitrance.

This point is not meant to imply that NATO air forces were not threatened by Milosevic’s air defense assets – they most certainly were! The same Defense Department report states that even though we flew one-third fewer sorties in OAF than in Operation Desert Storm, our aircrews were exposed to the same number of missile launches in both campaigns. The Serbs often made a tactical decision to limit radar guidance to the missiles in flight. This action provided more protection to the enemy’s valuable radar tracking equipment while still threatening the attacking aircrews. Without precise radar guidance to the missile, these weapon systems are less likely to hit their intended targets

and, in the process, become less vulnerable to NATO anti-radiation missiles designed to home in on their emissions.

A final footnote on this issue concerns the relationship between attacking various targets simultaneously and achieving desired effects in a military operation. This concept, called Parallel Warfare, is another complex aspect of 21st century airpower strategy. In his book, *Firing For Effect: Change in the Nature of Warfare*, then Colonel David A. Deptula, USAF Air Campaign Planner during Operation Desert Storm, describes Parallel Warfare as “[a] capacity for simultaneous attack on the entire array of high value targets with little or no need to suppress enemy air defenses opens the door to monumental changes in the conduct of war.”⁷ Had we allowed OAF planners to conduct decisive attacks on Milosevic’s high-value assets using stealthy manned bombers and cruise missiles, we may have forced him to defend his country with all available means. This action would have exposed his air defenses to the full weight of our potent air defense suppression capabilities earlier in the campaign. Assuming allied success in both of these tasks (which is a safe bet considering that parallel warfare is the doctrine that led to our unprecedented buildup in air and space capabilities over the last decade), decisive battles could have been fought earlier in OAF ultimately resulting in a quicker victory for the North Atlantic Alliance. This strategy and course of action was precisely what General Short had been recommending from the start of the planning process in June of 1998.

Non-Decisive Force

After a few weeks of bombing, NATO’s civilian leaders and military commanders faced a double-edged dilemma: they had not deployed overwhelming air forces (or any

significant ground forces) and had not really attacked the enemy's actual centers of gravity. The leaders had not carefully analyzed the adversary and targeted the correct "assets of fundamental strategic, economic or even emotional importance to [the] enemy, loss of which would severely undermine [its] will or ability to fight."⁸ U.S. military doctrine states that with steadfast resolve from our leaders and the support of the American people and our allies, we should plan our strategy to hold these assets hostage or, when required, quickly damage or destroy them. The capability exists now in our military arsenal to accomplish this action immediately and decisively in any area of the globe - all military planners and commanders need is the strategy approved by our civilian leaders directing how and when to use decisive force, the desired end state, and then the political resolve to do just that.

Senator Joe Lieberman, (Democrat-Connecticut) in his opening address to the Fletcher Conference on Strategic Responsiveness summed up this new construct in military planning. In his statement he said the "current doctrine of overwhelming force is not politically viable all the time...we should consider maximum achievable force versus maximum possible force to ensure increased lethality to achieve devastating effect."⁹ It can be argued successfully that NATO deployed Senator Lieberman's so-called 'maximum achievable force' early on in the events leading up to hostilities. The missing variable in the NATO campaign planning was finding the point or points in Milosevic's power base where we could achieve 'devastating effect'. While the North Atlantic Council supposedly felt that punitive attacks on Yugoslavian military and police forces deployed in Kosovo would be that unique pressure point, General Short and his planners disagreed, and aggressively, as articles in the Washington Post accurately reported.¹⁰

According to Short, he “never believed that the Third Army in Kosovo was the center of gravity. Short believed the center of gravity was Milosevic and the leadership cadre around him and they were in Belgrade.” He went on to say that his orders remained to attack the Third Army regularly but that he had “no great confidence that that was going to bring Milosevic to the table” and ultimately be the “key event” of the war.¹¹ As mentioned earlier in the essay, Short’s assessment of Milosevic’s strategic pressure points were “the power grid, the lines of communication, again, as they impacted Belgrade in particular, the bridges across the Danube [river], the traffic patterns into and out of Belgrade … six to eight military command centers, headquarters of the MUP [police forces], headquarters of the VJ [military forces] once again, in Belgrade”.¹² These were the key elements of Milosevic’s power base that military planners wanted to attack with their limited, but potent, force in the earliest possible point in the campaign. All that was required was the political resolve of the NAC and allied governments to give the go ahead. The magnification of this political resolve took time in NATO’s coalition-building process and was also further complicated by Russia’s continued objection to the air war over Serbia. However, since the Russians had not committed their airmen to combat, allied interests should have been of greater significance once military actions commenced.

It has also been argued that the strategy employed by the NAC in this conflict was well thought out and ultimately effective. In the Department of Defense report to Congress on Allied Force, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton indicated that the strategy had actually evolved during the course of the campaign. They stated “although there were expectations on the part of some that this would be a short operation, the

United States made clear to its allies that Operation Allied Force could well take weeks or months to succeed and that the operation should be initiated only if all were willing to persevere until success was achieved.” They continued by saying “[m]aintaining alliance unity then became an overarching strategic objective in the offensive phase of the crisis.”¹³

The civilian leaders ultimately acceded to the military’s assessment that attacks on the strategic targets suggested by General Short would produce devastating effects on the enemy’s system and ultimately lead to Milosevic’s resumption of the peace process and acceptance of international demands. In their book, *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument*, Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman and Eric Larson argue that “[t]he successful coercive use of air power requires favorable conditions and often depends more on the strategy chosen by the adversary than on the overall might of the coercer.” They go on to list the three factors of coercive operations as “[e]scalation dominance, threatening to defeat an adversary’s military strategy and magnifying third-party threats”.¹⁴ These authors correctly describe the complicated calculus of today’s airpower doctrine. Simply attacking certain targets deemed valuable to the adversary will rarely result in the desired end state, let alone a cessation of hostilities. Byman and his associates sum this up by writing:

A problem related to underestimating the adversary’s resilience is overestimating the coercer’s effectiveness or the value of the target. In so doing, the coercer assumes that the costs being imposed are higher than they actually are. Practitioners often ignore the robustness of target sets, assuming that the enemy will not be able to repair destroyed facilities or overstating the damage done to a target.¹⁵

This statement best sums up the effects NATO had on Milosevic during the early phase of the campaign. Milosevic could repair his damaged SAM sites and replace his

destroyed equipment. He also did not seem to place a really high value on these forces and the costs needed to replace them. The statement also alludes to the difficulty civilian leaders and military commanders have in predicting any outcome of a specific military operation short of total annihilation. Byman, Waxman and Larson go on to say, "In essence, some adversaries cannot be coerced," and that in a few cases, "the perceived costs of giving in are so dreaded that virtually no military threat will compel the adversary to bend."¹⁶

Milosevic obviously struggled with his own decisions to cease his ethnic-cleansing actions in Kosovo and yield to international demands. We will probably not come to a full understanding of the rationale for his decisions for years to come. We can, however, learn from this campaign a few facts regarding the application of military power. Limiting both the magnitude of the force applied and the areas of the enemy's system of power held hostage or attacked simply prolongs the campaign. It is safe to say that rational, democratic leaders who share similar values with NATO leaders would never snub their noses at any and all diplomatic efforts to defuse a crisis. Logically then, in dealing with less rational leaders or known rogues, the application of military force as a last resort must be decisive. We must either use overwhelming force to quickly take control of the situation or begin to probe at the heart of the problem with decisive attacks designed to cause immediate negative effects in the enemy's power base. Senator John McCain addressed this issue in his book, *Faith of My Fathers* when he wrote:

Most of the pilots flying the missions [during Vietnam] believed that our targets were virtually worthless. We had long believed that our attacks, more often than not limited to trucks, trains, and barges, were not just failing to break the enemy's resolve but actually having the opposite effect

by boosting Vietnam's confidence that it could withstand the full measure of American airpower.¹⁷

As history has written in the aftermath of Vietnam, incremental, limited application of force with significant political restraint will not convince rogue leader's to stop anything. Only with clear, decisive strategy and effects-based operations that maximize our advantages can we expect to effectively use military power to solve tomorrow's crises.

Notes

¹ Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's Doctrine on committing U.S. forces to combat as reprinted in Air Force Magazine, Dec 99 issue, p. 38.

² Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army General Colin Powell's Doctrine on Use of Force, as restated in *Modern U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Wielding the Terrible Swift Sword* by David E. Johnson, Jul 97, p. ix.

³ Speech by German Army General Klaus Nauman, during the Fletcher Conference on Strategic Responsiveness. General Nauman was the chairman of the NATO military committee during Operation Allied Force.

⁴ Editorial by John A. Tirpak, Senior Editor of Air Force Magazine, Sep 99.

⁵ Statement by U.S. Army General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, during Operation Allied Force, as reported in Air Force Magazine, Nov 99, p. 13.

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense Unclassified "Report to Congress, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report", dated 31 Jan 00, p. 64.

⁷ *Firing for Effect: Change in the Nature of Warfare*, by Colonel David A. Deptula, a book published by Air and Space Education Foundation in its series on Defense and Airpower Studies, Aug 95, p. 5.

⁸ Doctrinal definition of Center of Gravity as reprinted by Air Force Magazine, Sep 99 issue, in John A. Tirpak's article titled "Short's View of the Air Campaign", p. 43.

⁹ Senator Joseph Lieberman's opening speech at the Fletcher Conference on Strategic Responsiveness, Nov 99.

¹⁰ Washington Post Article, October 1999.

¹¹ Interview with Lieutenant General Michael Short, USAF, conducted by Public Broadcasting System Reporter, Roll # 250; personal copy page 10.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 3.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense Unclassified "Report to Congress, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report", dated 31 Jan 00, p. 7.

¹⁴ Quote from *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument*, by Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman and Eric Larson, a RAND publication, p. 29.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 47.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 52.

Notes

¹⁷ *Faith of My Fathers, A Family Memoir*, by John McCain with Mark Salther, The Easton Press, Random House, Inc., 1999, pages 186-187.

Part 6

RESTRAINING THE FORMIDABLE FORCE

Airpower is an attractive coercive tool because the amount of force employed can be discrete and limited, resulting in relatively few casualties on either side and enabling policy makers to exert considerable control over the scope and scale of operations...it can not only strike quickly but can be withdrawn quickly¹

Such is the reality of politically restrained options for military operations in support of U.S. National Security Strategy. Today's political leaders, both in Washington D.C. and in our allies' capitals, are faced with an ever-increasing demand to wield the military instrument of power in trouble spots around the globe. According to Lawrence Korb, the vice-president and director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “[t]he United States needs to decide what kind of military force it wants in the coming years...the challenge for our national security decision-makers is deciding when to use our military forces.” He continued on with the thought that after the Gulf war, “U.S. forces began to be deployed with increasing frequency and became the preferred instrument for implementing U.S. Foreign Policy.”² With this distinction of being the preferred instrument for civilian policy makers, the military has had to learn all over again what operating in a politically charged, limited-scale environment is like. It

requires a reexamination of previously stated doctrines about how and when to use force that were articulated clearly by previous Secretaries of Defense and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many observers have reported widely on the reluctance of these former leaders to commit U.S. forces to battle without clear, overarching strategy and guidance. But restraints on such actions continue, and many of their successors have resolved themselves to the difficult task of avoiding the costly mistakes of yesterday's wars – most notably Vietnam, Somalia and Haiti - while directing more and more frequent military operations around the world.

KOSOVO AND VIETNAM - A STUNNING COMPARISON

The comparisons between the political restraints applied in Operation Allied Force and the early campaigns of Vietnam are again worth noting. Consider this statement by Walter J. Boyne in an article in the November 1999 issue of Air Force Magazine:

The planners called for [the operation's] attacks to begin at a relatively low level in the southern [part of the country]. If the enemy did not react properly – that is, with a realization that the United States was so strong that the idea of conquering [the disputed territory] had to be given up – the program was to be moved northward and increased incrementally in intensity.³

The strategy expressed above could be used to describe operations in both Rolling Thunder and Linebacker I during the Vietnam War or during Phase One of Allied Force in Kosovo. The political restraints placed on the military commanders in both wars were nearly identical when viewed in the U.S. context alone. What is troubling to most military commanders is how this strategy exposed U.S. troops to increased risk and ultimately prolonged the conflict.

Boyne sums up the effects of this ‘incremental’ strategy *during the Vietnam War* in the following statements. “In Linebacker II, joint operations were [finally] conducted and the Rules of Engagement were relaxed to permit simultaneous attacks on airfields [and other key targets]...a signal that North Vietnam could understand.” He contended, “The same net results could have been done easily and with less exposure eight years and more than 47,000 lives earlier.”⁴

Incremental Strategy - Uncertain Results

Some historians would argue with Boyne’s premise that, in the absence of our incremental strategy in Vietnam, we could have saved 47,000 American lives. But history has shown that President Johnson and Secretary McNamara’s micromanagement of the Vietnam War from the oval office proved costly for the American people in many, many ways. Senator McCain summed up the flawed results of Johnson and McNamara’s wartime leadership by referring to a speech his father made after the war. In the speech, then Admiral John McCain, Sr., Commander in Chief Pacific Command during the latter years of the Vietnam War mentioned “two deplorable decisions” they made in developing the grand strategy for the war.

The first was the public decision to forbid U.S. troops to enter North Vietnam and beat the enemy on his home ground...The Second was...to forbid the [strategic] bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong until the last two weeks of the conflict...These two decisions combined to allow Hanoi to adopt whatever strategy they wished, knowing that there would be virtually no reprisal, no counterattack.⁵

Regarding the “fuzzy” strategy of OAF, history will again be the ultimate judge. Nevertheless, the significant political restraints placed on General Clark and General Short in planning and executing the air campaign no doubt reduced the effectiveness of

our military capabilities and increased the exposure to potent air defenses for the allied aircrews. Senator Ted Warner, during his opening statement in the Kosovo hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee, summed this up by saying: “[m]ilitary commanders need at their disposal all the assets and capabilities that are in the arsenal of the nation...and given the maximum amount of discretion in how to deploy those assets to achieve the goals that are laid down by the political leaders.”⁶

During the course of the Allied Force operation, General Richard Hawley, USAF, Commander of Air Combat Command at the time, stated, “[a]irpower works best when it is used decisively. Shock, mass are the way to achieve early results. Clearly, because of the constraints of the [Allied Force] operation, we haven’t seen that at this point.”⁷ The reasons for the significant political and military restraint applied in OAF were varied and complicated. The over-riding circumstance was the obvious requirement to maintain unity in the NATO alliance. All of the countries held a strong belief that success hinged on minimizing allied (and Serbian) civilian casualties as well as limiting collateral damage in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.⁸ Hidden in this second desire to limit collateral damage in Serbia-proper is another aspect of effects-based planning - the requirement for military planners to anticipate the negative, or unintended, effects of our destructive capabilities on public opinion.

Unintended Effects

An example of this situation is contained in a 1992 report in The New England Journal of Medicine. The Journal detailed the conclusion of a health study on conditions in Iraq after Desert Storm. It reported that these “results provide strong evidence that the Gulf War and trade sanctions caused a three-fold increase in mortality among Iraqi

children under five years of age.” The Journal went on to say “[t]he destruction of the country’s power plants had brought its entire system of water purification and distribution to a halt, leading to epidemics of cholera, typhoid fever, and gastroenteritis, particularly among children.”⁹ Wielding these awesome destructive capabilities carries with it an equally daunting responsibility to comply with the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) and the key tenets of the Just War Theory. Military commanders and their planners must determine both the positive and negative effects of destroying certain militarily significant targets deemed critical to the enemy’s power base. As stated earlier, JWAC is uniquely postured to provide this analysis in future conflicts, especially when the effects-based construct for planning is used by our civilian leaders.

This essay will not delve into the discussion of Just War Theory except to emphasize the need for military and civilian leaders to recognize this significant responsibility. Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger sums up this issue by stating:

A recurring challenge to airmen that was recognized once again during the Gulf War was their inability to effectively and definitively measure the effects of air attack at the strategic level of war...when a bomb hits a transformer and shuts off electricity to a certain area, the effect of that black-out on the enemy leadership...is not so obvious, although intuitively it is recognized as being significant. The inability to measure strategic effects is the greatest challenge facing airmen today, because, until it is possible, it is difficult to articulate airpower’s uniqueness and importance.”¹⁰

An experienced air campaign planner would footnote Colonel Meilinger’s accurate assessment of this dilemma by challenging our political leaders and other government agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department to provide clear assessments of possible courses of action during the planning process. As mentioned in a previous section, strategy development requires accurate assessments of those effects on the enemy that are deemed critical to achieving victory. This

discussion must include the negative side of our destructive actions as well as the positive effects they might achieve. With this analysis, our leaders can accurately weigh the military advantages of specific courses of action against the political liabilities and possible negative effects in order to select the best one. Determining key centers of gravity and desired strategic effects for military operations needs to be a collective effort of our nation's finest minds. In DoD's report on OAF, the authors correctly label this issue as a "Major Observation" in the conduct of alliance and coalition warfare. Regarding interagency planning, they recommend expanding the "scope of policy actions considered during planning" and also state "our experience in Operation Allied Force has shown that Presidential Directive 56, *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, had not yet been fully institutionalized throughout the interagency planning process."¹¹ When we commit forces in war, all inputs to developing overarching strategy are essential. Ambassadors, congressional leaders, intelligence directors, regional and cultural experts, all need to go on record in recommending what they feel are the necessary desired effects against selected centers of gravity that will deliver victory quickest. It should not be (and rarely is) left solely up to military planners and commanders to make these critical assessments. Furthermore, once the National Command Authorities make the final call, their decisions should be clearly stated to minimize the second-guessing and casual interpretation of our overall strategy. By so doing, our stated national and coalition interests and objectives can be accurately traced to a series of military objectives and tasks aimed at achieving a specific list of desired effects. With this effects-based construct, we will more effectively wield the United States' aerospace power as a coercive instrument of national policy.

Notes

¹ Quote from *Air Power as a Coercive Instrument*, by Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman and Eric Larson, a RAND publication, p. 3.

² Article written by Mr. Lawrence J. Korb in Government Executive Magazine title "Force is the Issue", Jan 00, p. 31.

³ Article titled "Route Pack 6" by Walter J. Boyne in Air Force Magazine, Nov 99, p. 57.

⁴ Ibid, p. 61.

⁵ *Faith of My Fathers, A Family Memoir*, by John McCain with Mark Salther, The Easton Press, Random House, Inc., 1999, page 261. Brackets placed around the word 'strategic' are included in the text of the book. They are assumed to be Senator John McCain's emphasis on the types of attacks, or bombings his father referred to in his speech.

⁶ Statement by U.S. Senator Ted Warner, R-VA, during Kosovo hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee.

⁷ Remarks by USAF General Richard Hawley, former Commander of USAF Air Combat Command to the Defense Writers Group, 29 Apr 99, p. 12.

⁸ As reported by Rebecca Grant in her report on the conduct of Operation Allied Force titled "The Kosovo Campaign: Air and Space Power Made it Work", Sep 99, p. 12.

⁹ 1992 The New England Journal of Medicine report on consequences of Operation Desert Storm allied air campaign against electrical grid targets.

¹⁰ Article titled "The Next Air Campaign" by Colonel Philip S. Meilinger, USAF, in the Oct/Nov 97 issue of Air and Space Smithsonian.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense Unclassified "Report to Congress, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report", dated 31 Jan 00, p. 126.

Part 7

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE'S ROLE

Only the dead have seen the end of war.

—Plato
Unknown

Developing strategy for the use of force has never been a simple task and never will be in a free society. Commanding our military forces in warfare is a unique human endeavor that requires a nation's leaders to take full advantage of its military capabilities and might while still protecting the rights of innocent human beings stuck in the middle of a catastrophic dilemma. The high-level, strategic decisions required to ensure accountability in the court of public opinion after a war are ones that, quite often, define the core values and principles of a nation and its people.

KOSOVO AND BOSNIA – A COMMON DEFINITION

The Military's Responsibility

Faced with this compelling need to stay connected with the general population of our country during war, America's political and military leaders have a responsibility to educate them on the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century. According to U.S. Army Lieutenant General Richard Chilcoat in his convocation speech to the National

War College Class of 2000, “It’s our [the military’s] responsibility to educate ourselves, our civilian leaders, and our society about our business and our profession.”¹ U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Marvin Esmond, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, further defines this requirement for airpower proponents in a publication titled Global Engagement Operations (GEO). In the ‘How We Operate’ section, Esmond states “GEO should tell this air and space story to three audiences...internal AF...joint audiences...and finally a civilian audience that requires a story of AF capabilities to protect its broad interests in the international environment.”² It can be assumed, for the purpose of this essay, that the first two audiences mentioned by General Esmond- internal AF personnel and joint audiences - are in the process of being ‘educated’ on the new and decisive air and space capabilities contained in the U.S. military arsenal.

The other audience mentioned by both Chilcoat and Esmond is the topic for the final section of this essay. The American people and, specifically, the civilian leaders and diplomatic practitioners of our democratic system need military commanders to provide them with a more consistent argument for best using our overwhelming aerospace power. They deserve a clear and concise definition of our planning and strategy development processes in order to be able to apply lessons learned from one conflict to the next.

Operation Deliberate Force

In his book, *To End a War*, current United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, outlines just such a confusing discussion about the use of airpower during the Bosnia crisis in 1995. In the book, he describes the ineffective ‘retaliatory pinpricks’ approved by international leaders to punish the Bosnian-Serb

forces for their ethnic-cleansing operations in the Yugoslav province of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a memo to the incoming Clinton Administration's National Security team regarding what to do in Bosnia in 1991, Holbrooke wrote:

Bombing the Serbs and even Serbia proper if necessary would send the proper message. However, the actions must be effective, both militarily and politically! ... If done only to show the world we are "doing something," minor bombing-like the enforcement of the no-fly zone—might be a quick public relations success, but it would be followed by a long-term disaster.³

He then went on in the book to describe what he called a "sustained air campaign" designed to compel Milosevic and the Bosnian-Serb leaders to come to the bargaining table in Dayton, Ohio, to end the conflict once and for all. In a conversation between Ambassador Holbrooke and acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the two men spoke of the need for a possible military response to the Bosnian Serbs' bombing of Sarajevo that killed or injured over a hundred civilians:

Our telephone conversation was about how to respond to the newest Bosnian Serb atrocity, but it was also part of a controversy that had gone on for thirty years about the relationship between diplomacy and airpower. This issue had haunted American decision makers since 1965, when the use of airpower against North Vietnam had been one of the most controversial of all American wars.⁴

Holbrooke had correctly identified a lingering problem between the U.S. military and civilian leadership as to how we can best use our airpower capabilities. Our military doctrine had evolved after Vietnam to list clarity of mission, unity of command, robust rules of engagement, political will and a well-defined exit strategy as over-riding imperatives of military operations. But the discussion regarding how best to apply airpower was still very much in turmoil. Clausewitz himself suggested an alternative to traditional land-centric campaign planning when he said, "[b]ut there is another way [to

gain victory]. It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy's forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions...they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies.”⁵ Instead of focusing airpower as a supporting aspect of the land campaign, (especially when there is no land campaign) airpower proponents recognize decisive use of force as attacking strategic centers of gravity, employing effects-based operations, neutralizing the enemy's offensive capabilities, disabling his integrated air defense systems and protecting coalition [or U.S.] capabilities. These are not universally accepted imperatives in the diplomatic and policy-making community or, for that matter, inside the Pentagon. They are, however, what this author believes make up the requisites for Holbrooke's “sustained air campaign” mentioned repeatedly in the book, *To Win a War*. The current United States Ambassador to the United Nations summed up his views on this matter during an interview for a documentary titled “Airpower and Diplomacy in Bosnia, 1992 – 1995.” In the documentary, he stated:

In my view, a clear and unambiguous warning to Milosevic followed by the early use of airpower might have brought us a better outcome than Dayton [Peace Accords] four years earlier without most of the 300,000 dead and 2 ½ million homeless that were caused.⁶

In order to determine the education process required to inform key civilian leaders about aerospace power's new capabilities, a few of our nation's brightest diplomatic practitioners and political experts were interviewed regarding this differentiation between minor retaliatory pinpricks and a sustained air campaign. Their thoughts and insights on the definitions are informative if not persuasive.

Different Thoughts

Mr. Casimir A. Yost worked on the personal staff of Senator Charles Mathias as well as the Senate Foreign Relations committee and is now the Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. When asked about the difference between “minor retaliatory pinpricks” and a “sustained air campaign,” he related the fact that the former is often used to convince a politician’s constituency that he or she is doing something in response to an international crisis. He elaborated further by saying “[a] President may act because his domestic political base requires it. This is not a frivolous reason in a democracy. A second answer is to send a message to an enemy.” Yost listed examples of these types of retaliation to include attacks on Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist operations in Afghanistan and the United States’ unilateral attack on Libya after it was discovered that Moammar Gadhaffi sponsored terrorist actions against westerners. When it comes to a sustained air campaign, Mr. Yost stated the need “to have a real impact on an enemy’s capabilities or actions... Such a campaign should secure goals you have set for yourself. If it cannot then it should be augmented by other pressures - military, diplomatic, etc. The cost of not succeeding in achieving announced objectives can be high.”⁷

This straightforward distinction between minor air attacks and sustained offensive operations highlights the reasons why the allies did not achieve their stated goals in Phase One of OAF. Limited, punitive attacks against a few elements of Milosevic’s fielded forces never had a chance of achieving the strategic objectives and overall purpose of OAF as delineated by President Clinton and Secretary of State Cohen. It took decisive attacks on Serbia’s strategic centers of gravity to extract from Milosevic and his cronies the price they were unwilling to pay for their crimes against the Kosovar-Albanians.

Dr. Chester Crocker was Assistant Secretary of State for Africa during the Reagan administration and is currently the James R. Schlesinger Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. In a series of discussions and written remarks about Operations Allied and Deliberate Force in the Balkans, he shed some light on the role of airpower in diplomacy in the 21st Century. Regarding the political assessments made by international leaders leading up to OAF, Crocker commented that the analysis “was not strategic either in the sense of the strategic use of overwhelming air campaigns or in the broader sense of the relationship between air and ground efforts and how to convince him [Milosevic] we were deadly serious.” When asked about the military’s responsibility to educate our political leaders on the revolution in military affairs, Crocker stated, “...the civilians don’t ask for such a presentation. But I believe our uniformed services bear a substantial burden of responsibility as well; they need to volunteer what could be done and what is achievable at what cost/risk and not just wait to be asked for something by the inter-agency process.” When asked for a definition of a sustained air campaign, Dr. Crocker replied that “it must be designed to break his [the enemy leader’s] will by incorporating elements that rip away critical assets, include a dynamic element of surprise, and overall contain the potential to shake up his expectations and scare him. In other words, effects-based.”⁸

Professor Bernard Finel is the Associate Director for the National Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. During a personal interview and in written statements, he made the following points on the decisive use of airpower in smaller-scale contingencies as well as Operation Allied Force. “I don’t think there was any clear assessment of what the political goals of the operation were going into the campaign.

The administration's strategy was to coerce the Serbs. But it wasn't clear to me that they had either thought carefully about how to coerce Milosevic or about what he might do in response...Ultimately, it isn't clear that based on the political concept, any sort of coherent military missions were possible. In the end, Milosevic only conceded AFTER we had significantly modified our demands.⁹ When asked about the military's responsibility to better inform our political leaders about our decisive air and space capabilities, Finel responded by saying “[t]he civilian leadership, on the whole, does not understand either the utility or limits of military force. Their views on military force are formed through a combination of half-understood axioms, inappropriate analogies, and political biases. The military could help by sponsoring more communication. But the military is also to blame because in their annual budget battles the services oversell the capabilities of certain programs, while claiming that overall they are under funded. The result is a bizarre paradox that the services seem to be less than the sum of their parts. I think this adds to the confusion among civilians.”¹⁰

These interviews and statements by key advisors, practitioners and academicians in the foreign policy arena provide a dramatic insight into the need for better explanation of the unique characteristics of our aerospace power by our senior uniformed leaders. It is a process and endeavor that will require significant amounts of time and dedication if we are to learn from our past inefficiencies and mistakes in using force when diplomacy breaks down. Aerospace power is but one element of the United States' significant military arsenal but the precision, lethality and flexibility it offers our National Command Authorities in times of crisis makes it a key component of any international crisis action we will take in the future. Understanding the strategic capabilities of U.S. aerospace

power and the operational art required to employ it effectively must remain a high priority for our nation's leaders, both military and civilian. Finally, and equally daunting is the task of convincing our global allies that inefficient use of our unique aerospace power capabilities merely extends crises and usually causes unnecessary loss of life and human tragedy.

Notes

¹ Convocation Speech to the National War College Class of 2000 by Lt. General Richard Chilcoat, U.S. Army and Commandant of the University.

² United States Air Force Global Engagement Operations, by Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, Lieutenant General Marvin Esmond.

³ From the book, *To End a War*, by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, p. 52.

⁴ Ibid p. 92

⁵ *On War*, by Carl von Clausewitz, Book One, Chapter Two

⁶ Verbal statement made by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in the interactive compact disk documentary titled "Airpower and Diplomacy in Bosnia, 1992-1995, produced by IRIS Independent Research, Arlington Virginia.

⁷ Written statement by Mr. Casimir A. Yost, Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, following a personal interview by the author, 1 Mar 00.

⁸ Written statement by Dr. Chester Crocker, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University on 17 Feb 00 and personal interview by Lt Colonel H.D. Polumbo, (author) on 26 Jan 00.

⁹ 'All Caps' emphasis was used in Professor Finel's written statement.

¹⁰ Written statement by Professor Bernard Finel, Associate Director National Securities Studies Program, Georgetown University on 7 Feb 00 and personal interview by Lt Colonel H.D. Polumbo, (author) on 12 Jan 00.

Part 8

Conclusions

A thorough review of Operation Allied Force one year after the first missiles and bombs hit targets in Kosovo reveals some significant problems with the grand strategy and course of action selected by the allies. The continuing cultural and political problems in Kosovo and Serbia-proper are well documented in many newspaper articles and the situation facing our ground forces today is both chaotic and dangerous.

Restraints imposed on the military in this operation reflect valid, political concerns from the leaders of the North Atlantic Council and our own National Command Authorities. The list should form a basis for future military commanders' actions in trouble spots within their area of responsibility. Western leaders will almost always emphasize the need to minimize risk to their military forces unless the adversary's power and resolve requires an all-out effort like we saw in the two world wars of the 20th century. Civilian casualties on both sides of the next conflict will serve to focus public, and thus political opinion on the methods used in the prosecution of a war. OAF reflected an intense desire to minimize civilian casualties in Kosovo and Serbia, thus maintaining NATO cohesion and stabilizing Eastern Europe. Minimizing collateral damage seems now to be the norm since U.S. military forces are so adept at destroying selected targets while avoiding others in the vicinity. The sterling results in this effort

during OAF reflect great credit upon the professional skills and dedication of the military personnel serving our country today. Consequently, all commanders anticipating the planning for and execution of smaller scale contingencies in their region should use this list as a starting point for limiting the use of force in a conflict.

What was lacking in the air war over Serbia was a more decisive strategy designed to extract an untenable price from Milosevic for his atrocities while still operating within these restraints. The grand strategy NATO adopted through its difficult consensus-building process failed to overcome the limits imposed by alliance and coalition warfare. This assessment highlights the key conclusion of this essay- that United States military forces have the capability today to be immediately decisive even in a politically restrained environment. All that is required is a strategy that focuses on effects-based operations using a strategy to task methodology which links violent attack on selected targets to achieving desired effects stated in the objectives. In Operation Allied Force, our strategy was target-centric and incremental instead of **effects-based and parallel**. The inefficient use of U.S. aerospace power and resulting protracted campaign stretched our forces thin, exposed our airmen to unnecessary threats and failed to achieve the best possible political end state.

Another key lesson learned from OAF is the need for more training and instruction of our military and civilian leaders in order to truly reap the benefits of our significant advantages in aerospace power. Military leaders must take the time and make the effort to explain effects-based operations to our civilian leaders in order to prepare them for the next crisis we will encounter in the future. The explanations must be standardized and established in well-written doctrine so terminology and definitions are the same for all

participants in the strategy-building dialogue. Civilian leaders need to develop more confidence in the military's ability to use rapid and precise attacks in parallel actions against an enemy's centers of gravity in order to render the adversary vulnerable and force him to accept international demands.

Military planners must also develop effects-based campaign plans that can operate effectively in a politically restrained environment. The NCA decision-making process should embrace this 'effects-based' construct and not shift immediately to a discussion of specific and contentious targets just before the shooting starts. Political resolve must be developed early to hold critical components of the enemy's power base at risk using attacks that maximize desired effects while minimizing negative and unintended effects.

The 78-day military campaign known as Operation Allied Force was ultimately successful in stopping the systematic expulsion and elimination of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. It also put Slobodan Milosevic's regime in peril in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The operation did not, however, solve the deep, imbedded cultural and societal problems of the region. Much more political, economic and military diplomacy is required in the disintegrating former Republic of Yugoslavia. Military intervention in a crisis such as this one should never be considered in isolation, but when military force is used, the strategy adopted must be effects-based, decisive and designed, ultimately, to produce a better political end state than existed before the war.

Glossary

CINC	Commander in Chief
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
COG	Center of Gravity
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GEO	Global Engagement Operations
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC	Joint Forces Air Component Commander
JWAC	Joint Warfare Center
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MUP	Yugoslav Interior Forces (Special Forces)
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAF	Operation Allied Force
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
USEUCOM	United States European Command
VJ	Yugoslav Army

Key Definitions

Aerospace Power. Air Force Doctrine Document 1-2, *Air Force Glossary*, 9 Jul 1999, defines *aerospace power* as “the synergistic application of air, space and information systems to project global strategic military power.” *Aerospace power*, as it is used in this paper, describes the use of aircraft, spacecraft, and information in the air and/or space medium to project military power in order to create political and military effects. *Air power* and *space power* are subsets of aerospace power. *Aerospace power* will be used throughout the text unless citing a work that uses another similar term (e.g., *air power*, *airpower*, *air and space power*) or if the term, *air power*, is required in the context of reflecting the time before space flight. The same general meaning is inferred regardless.

Center of Gravity. A center of gravity, as it applies to effects-based operations is an asset of fundamental strategic, economic or even emotional importance to an adversary, loss of which would severely undermine its will or ability to fight. (U.S. Joint Staff Pub 1-02, describes COGs as ‘those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. AF Doctrine Pub DD1-2 further defines COGs by stating ‘They exist at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.’)

Effects-based Operations. Effects-based operations are attacks or operations conducted against an adversary’s key elements of national power and functions in the most efficient manner to produce specific effects consistent with the joint forces commander’s objectives and the National Command Authorities’ stated goals.

Effect. (Baier) The physical or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from a specific military action. Effects can occur at all levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) and may in and of themselves produce secondary outcomes. Effects can be described as direct or indirect. Generally speaking, particular military actions are planned and executed to create certain effects that help achieve specific objectives.

Parallel Warfare. Parallel warfare is a capacity for simultaneous attack on the entire array of high value targets with little or no need to suppress enemy air defenses. Leadership facilities, key essentials such as refined oil and electricity, transportation nets, connectivity between leadership and the population, and fielded military forces are attacked at the same time in order to control the opponent’s strategic activity. (Baier - The idea that aerospace operations are most effective when they create effects that help achieve different levels of objectives at the same time. The notion of simultaneous attack is imbedded in this idea.)

Strategy to Task. The ‘strategy to task’ concept is simply the mental (or actual) charting of connections between strategic objectives and goals through military objectives all the way down to specific tasks assigned to particular fighting units. Using this methodology, military commanders and planners are able to analyze the effects of their actions in the conduct of warfare in order to assess success or failure of military operations at the three levels of warfare: strategic, operational and tactical.

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